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AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN SECURITIES
INDUSTRY ARBITRATION: WORKING FOR A JUST
RESULT
Anthony Michael Sabino*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is often said that the business of America is business, and
probably the best exemplifications of that old truism are the na-
tion's stock exchanges. To be sure, not only stock, but bonds, op-
tions, commodities, futures, and a whole plethora of instruments
are traded daily in exchanges large and small, in a seamless web
straddling the country, if not the world.
When disputes over these transactions arise, as they must from
time to time, it is now an accepted practice to submit such contro-
versies to a panel of arbitrators for resolution. Arbitration is
viewed as an expedient and less costly alternative to litigating in
the federal or state courts; as such, it is an increasingly popular
form of dispute resolution. While admittedly imperfect, arbitration
generally works in that it resolves disputes with a lesser expendi-
ture of time and resources. Thus, the parties may quickly return to
the wilds of the trading floors and to the pursuit of profits.
Recently, a new issue has arisen regarding the scope of arbitra-
tors' powers to award damages. Parties have challenged arbitra-
tors' ability to award punitive damages1 to a victorious party as
part of an arbitral award. The legal question of whether arbitrators
* Associate, Marks & Murase, New York, New York; Adjunct Professor of Law, St. John's
University College of Business Administration; B.S., 1980, St. John's University College of
Business Administration; J.D., 1983, St. John's University School of Law.
The author dedicates this article to Nancy Eileen Susca, Esq., Shapiro & Kreisman, New
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1. By definition, exemplary or punitive damages are awarded:
to punish the defendant for his evil behavior or to make an example of him, for which
reason they are also called "punitive" or "punitory" damages or "vindictive" dam-
ages. Unlike compensatory or actual damages, punitive or exemplary damages are
based upon an entirely different public policy consideration - that of punishing the
defendant or of setting an example for similar wrongdoers, as above noted. In cases in
which it is proved that a defendant has acted willfully, maliciously, or fraudulently, a
plaintiff may be awarded exemplary damages in addition to compensatory or actual
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can award punitive damages does not turn upon the pros and cons
of arbitrators acting as policemen meting out punishment to
wrongdoers. Rather, its determination requires resolution of the
conflict between federal arbitration law and differing state law
principles as to what damages in those forums arbitrators are per-
mitted to award.
Not surprisingly, the answer to this question has significant fi-
nancial repercussions for the securities industry, its customers, and
for any other persons who submit to arbitration. This article first
will explore the basic powers created by the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA" or the "Act").2 Next, it will examine two decisions of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that
have become lightning rods of controversy. In addition, this article
will review the key precedents established in this area by the
United States Supreme Court. Finally, possible methods for resolv-
ing this vitally important question will be suggested.
II. FEDERAL ARBITRATION - AN OVERVIEW
Before addressing the particular arbitration mechanism used in
the securities industry, it is helpful to review the body of federal
law that has established basic guidelines governing arbitration.
Justice O'Connor drafted an eloquent introduction to this subject
while writing for a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon:3
The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 [to 307], provides the
starting point for answering the questions raised in this case. The
Act was intended to "revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to arbi-
tration agreements," Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., supra, at 510, by
"plac[ing] arbitration agreements 'upon the same footing as other
contracts.'" 417 U.S., at 511, quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1, 2 (1924). The Arbitration Act accomplishes this purpose
by providing that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. The Act also pro-
vides that a court must stay its proceedings if it is satisfied that an
issue before it is arbitrable under the agreement, § 3; and it autho-
damages. Damages other than compensatory damages which may be awarded against
[a] person to punish him for outrageous conduct.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
3. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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rizes a federal district court to issue an order compelling arbitration
if there has been a "failure, neglect, or refusal" to comply with the
arbitration agreement, § 4.
The federal arbitration law was designed "to overrule the judici-
ary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate,"5
and, as Justice O'Connor noted, to place such agreements "'upon
the same footing as other contracts.' ,, For these reasons, the U.S.
Supreme Court has declared that it will "rigorously enforce agree-
ments to arbitrate. '7 Central to the statutory scheme of the FAA is
section 2 thereof, which provides that "[a] written provision in...
a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
.. . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.""
The provisions of the FAA pre-empt "arbitration agreements
within the full reach of the Commerce Clause."9 As Justice Bren-
nan resolutely pointed out in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp.,10 "Section 2 [of the FAA] is a con-
gressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion agreements .... The effect of the section is to create a body
4. Id. at 225-26. McMahon clearly was the watershed in securities industry arbitrations,
as it formally authorized arbitration of statutory anti-fraud claims made pursuant to the
federal securities laws. Id. at 238.
5. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985).
6. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 225 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11
(1974)).
7. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221.
8. 9 U.S.C. § 2. The full text of the statute reads as follows:
VALIDITY, IRREVOcABILITY, AND ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transac-
tion involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.
Id.
9. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987). But cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 135-36 (1973) (holding that New York Stock Exchange
rules militated against existence of a clear federal intent to require arbitration). Ware's rele-
vancy now is questionable because of the considerable evolution of arbitration law since the
case was decided.
10. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbi-
tration agreement within the coverage of the Act."'1 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit later reaffirmed this analy-
sis, stating that "Congress created national substantive law gov-
erning questions of the validity and the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements under its coverage.' 1 2 Therefore, once a court,
state or federal, determines that a dispute is covered by the FAA,
federal substantive law, as set forth in the FAA and federal court
decisions, will govern the scope and interpretation of the
agreement."
However, a curious duality exists in the FAA. In Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital, Justice Brennan stated:
The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of fed-
eral-court jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law
establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbi-
trate, yet it does not create any independent federal-question juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. V) or otherwise. Sec-
tion 4 provides for an order compelling arbitration only when the
federal district court would have jurisdiction over a suit on the un-
derlying dispute; hence, there must be diversity of citizenship or
some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction before the or-
der can issue. 14
As will be shown, this "anomaly" has played a role in the determi-
nation of whether arbitrators can award punitive damages and it
continues to spark controversy. 5
In the landmark case Southland Corp. v. Keating,"6 the U.S. Su-
preme Court determined that California's highest state court had
interpreted a state statute in direct conflict with the FAA. There-
fore, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution had
been violated. Chief Justice Burger found that, in enacting the
FAA, "Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and
withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
11. Id. at 24.
12. Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1987).
13. See, e.g., Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 949 (1972) (holding all disputes covered by the Act, including "questions of inter-
pretation, construction, validity, revocability and enforceability," will be governed by fed-
eral law).
14. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25 n.32.
15. See infra pp. 42-43 and notes 63-67.
16. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve
by arbitration.' 17
The majority opinion noted that the federal arbitration scheme
rested "on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules
under the Commerce Clause."' 8 Continuing this constitutional
analysis, Chief Justice Burger found earlier Court cases "implied
that the substantive rules of the Act were to apply in state as well
as federal courts."1 9 Logically, he continued, national lawmakers
could address "a problem of large significance in the field of com-
merce" only by creating a pervasive scheme which included both
federal and state courts. 20 Congress taking action pursuant to the
Commerce Clause also supports the conclusion that the FAA was
intended to apply to state courts. 21 Finally, the legislative history
of the FAA indicates that Congress contemplated this "broad
reach. ,22
It is apparent, therefore, that federal law controls the resolution
of issues concerning an arbitration agreement's "interpretation,
construction, validity, revocability, and enforceability." 23 If an is-
sue is arbitrable under federal law, it remains so despite any con-
trary state law.24 Some courts have found that federal law also gov-
erns the categories of claims subject to arbitration. 5
One could conclude that federal law has pre-empted any state
involvement in this arena. However, this result is not clear cut,
since the rationales relied upon by the U.S. Supreme Court have
varied. On one hand, the justices have flatly stated that, in enact-
ing the FAA, "Congress intended to foreclose state legislative at-
17. Id. at 10.
18. Id. at 11 (emphasis added); see also id. at 15 n.9 (noting "the [FAA] creates federal
substantive law").
19. Id. at 12.
20. Id. at 13.
21. Id. at 14-15.
22. Id. at 13.
23. Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
949 (1972).
24. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967). The
U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Prima Paint Corp. that granting a stay in the face of
contrary state law does not violate the Erie doctrine, since Congress, pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause, had authority to empower federal courts to grant stays when the conditions of
sections 2 and 3 of the Act are met. Id. at 404-05.
25. Supak & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 1979);
Becker Autoradio USA, Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1978).
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tempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements. '2 6
But the Court has also determined that "[t]he FAA contains no
express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional
intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration. '27 Therefore, state
law may be applied in arbitration matters, subject to pre-emption
only "to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law."2 8
The impact of the conflicting U.S. Supreme Court precedents is
exacerbated by the dissents in Southland Corp.,29 especially the
opinion written by Justice O'Connor and joined by Justice Rehn-
quist." In her dissent, Justice O'Connor vigorously urged that the
FAA's legislative history "establishes conclusively that the 1925
Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural statute," primarily be-
cause "Congress emphatically believed arbitration to be a matter
of 'procedure.' "31 The dissent further contended that "[n]one of
this Court's prior decisions has authoritatively construed the Act
otherwise, '3 2 as both Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Man-
ufacturing Co.33 and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mer-
cury Construction Corp. 4 involved federal court litigation, not
state court proceedings. "The applicability of the FAA to state-
court proceedings was simply not before the Court in either
case." Parenthetically, Justice O'Connor asserted that Congress
never intended the FAA to create substantive rights,36 nor to im-
pose the full range of federal procedural requirements upon state
tribunals.37 The Justice explained that the FAA "should have no
application whatsoever in state courts," and states should be given
the opportunity to "fashion their own procedures" for
arbitration."8
26. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
27. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989).
28. Id.; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)(holding federal law pre-emp-
tion will apply where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress").
29. 465 U.S. at 17.
30. Id. at 21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 25.
32. Id. at 30.
33. 388 U.S. 395 (1967); see supra note 24.
34. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
35. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 30 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Moreover,
Justice O'Connor found that the Court's decision in Prima Paint Corp. omitted any sugges-
tion that federal arbitration laws had to be applied by state courts. Id.
36. Id. at 30 n.19.
37. Id. at 31 n.20.
38. Id. at 31.
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Also dissenting in part was Justice Stevens, 9 who found "it is by
no means clear that Congress intended entirely to displace state
authority in this field."' 0 He opined:
The existence of a federal statute enunciating a substantive federal
policy does not necessarily require the inexorable application of a
uniform federal rule of decision notwithstanding the differing condi-
tions which may exist in the several States and regardless of the
decisions of the States to exert police powers as they deem best for
the welfare of their citizens. 41
In short, Justice Stevens believed differing state policies regarding
what is arbitrable "can be recognized without impairing the basic
purposes of the federal statute. '42
Notably, both Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor reasserted
their arguments three years later in Perry v. Thomas.43 In Perry,
Justice Stevens explained that in recent years, the U.S. Supreme
Court had "effectively rewritten" the FAA "to give it a pre-emp-
tive scope that Congress certainly did not intend."' 44 Justice
O'Connor commented in a similar vein, arguing that the FAA
should not apply to state court proceedings.46
From the foregoing discussion, the existence of a strong federal
policy favoring arbitration is evident. While the FAA has created
federal substantive law, its apparent supremacy and pre-emption
of state law is not set in stone. However, in the end, Justice Bren-
nan's determination that the FAA is binding in these disputes
should be accorded substantial weight. As the Justice explained,
"although enforcement of the Act is left in large part to the state
courts, it nevertheless represents federal policy to be vindicated by
the federal courts where otherwise appropriate."46 Against this
backdrop of somewhat conflicting principles, the scope of arbitra-
tors' power to award punitive damages may be addressed.
39. Id. at 17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 18.
41. Id. at 19.
42. Id. at 21.
43. 482 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1987).
44. Id. at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
46. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).
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III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT SPEAKS AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES
As stated earlier, two decisions rendered by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Second Circuit") have be-
come the focus of the controversy regarding the scope of arbitra-
tors' powers. It is not surprising that this tribunal has taken the
lead in addressing such matters, since the Second Circuit's juris-
diction includes the steel canyons of Wall Street, the ancestral
home of the securities industry.
A. Fahnestock & Co., Inc. v. Waltman
The Second Circuit's first decision addressing the propriety of
awarding punitive damages in securities industry arbitrations was
Fahnestock & Co., Inc. v. Waltman.47 In the process of closing
down its retirement trust department, Fahnestock, a stock broker-
age firm, dismissed Waltman. The discharge was not in dispute un-
til Waltman refused to return certain insurance files Fahnestock
claimed were its property.48
The brokerage firm pressed for the return of the disputed files
using New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") arbitration proce-
dures. Simultaneously, Fahnestock amended Waltman's Form U-
549 and asserted that Waltman was the subject of an internal re-
view due to suspected wrongdoing. Based upon the amended Form
U-5, Waltman filed a counterclaim in the arbitration proceedings
for defamation. °
The arbitration panel decided in Waltman's favor and awarded
damages against Fahnestock including $100,000 in punitive dam-
ages. When the brokerage firm challenged the arbitrators' judg-
ment in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, the court vacated the punitive damages portion of
the award. In so doing, the court relied upon a state court decision
47. 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 380 (1991), and cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1241 (1992).
48. 935 F.2d at 514.
49. Form U-5 is "a termination notice form that the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD") requires stock brokerage firms to file when they dismiss an employee."
Id.
50. Id.
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prohibiting arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. 51 The ap-
peal to the Second Circuit followed.
Writing for the Second Circuit panel, Judge Miner first set out
the basic premise that an arbitration award may be vacated where
the arbitrators have exceeded their powers52 or where they have
overtly disregarded the law.53 The court then noted, "[w]e have
consistently accorded the narrowest reading" to this statute.54 Ap-
plying these standards, Judge Miner was not persuaded that the
arbitrators had recklessly disregarded the law in awarding Walt-
man compensatory damages, 55 and the Second Circuit affirmed
that part of the decision. 56
The question of the propriety of the arbitral award of punitive
damages then was addressed. First, the tribunal found that the law
of New York state prohibited the award of punitive damages by an
arbitrator.5 7 Nonetheless, Waltman argued that the FAA pre-
empted state law; since the underlying agreement to arbitrate fell
under the FAA and "include[d] no restriction on the award of pu-
nitive damages under the governing rules of the New York Stock
Exchange, . . . there should be no bar to the award" of punitive
damage to him.5 8 The Second Circuit agreed with part of Walt-
man's argument and stated that "there is precedent ... that fed-
eral law and policy confers upon FAA arbitrators the right to
award punitive damages even where, as is not the case here, the
arbitration parties agree that New York law is to govern." 59 Unfor-
tunately for Waltman, the Second Circuit's opinion rejected the re-
mainder of the employee's argument.6 0
51. Id. at 514-15. The lower court relied upon Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793
(N.Y. 1976). Garrity had been subject to much criticism. See Thomas J. Stipanovich, Puni-
tive Damages in Arbitration, Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U.L. Rzv. 953,
959 (1986) (calling Garrity "an anomaly, frustrating the goals of fairness and finality that
are the essence of arbitration and undermining the valuable role that punitive damages play
in deterring fraudulent or malicious conduct.").
52. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 515 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1988)).
53. Id. (citing Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. v. Carte Blanche Int'l, Ltd., 888 F.2d
260, 265 (2d Cir. 1989)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 516.
56. Id. at 517.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1386-88 (11th Cir.
1988); Singer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 69 F. Supp. 276, 278 (S.D. Fla 1988)) (emphasis added).
60. Id.
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While acknowledging that the FAA's broad sweep pre-empts
state laws that deter the enforcement of arbitration agreements,
the appellate court found that the federal statutes do not com-
pletely pre-empt state law. Instead, the Second Circuit held that
state law "may be applied in arbitration matters, subject to pre-
emption only 'to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal
law.' "161 Finding "no conflict between the provisions of the FAA"
and the New York rule prohibiting the award of punitive damages
in arbitrations, the Second Circuit determined that the arbitrators
in this case were bound by the New York rule. For this reason, the
arbitrators in this case were bound by the New York rule. 2
Judge Miner did note that the arbitration agreement was silent
as to whether the arbitrators had the power to award punitive
damages .6  He explained that federal law might have permitted
such an award "[i]f the parties had agreed" beforehand, because
the "FAA provides for enforcement of the terms of such privately
negotiated agreements. '64 The judge then queried if state law
should be applied in situations "where the parties have not speci-
fied remedies and . . . the arbitrators therefore should be free to
fashion appropriate relief."6 5 He responded to his questions this
way:
The answer lies in the jurisdictional basis of the action giving rise to
this appeal. While the FAA "creates a body of federal substantive
law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to
arbitrate, . . . it does not create any independent federal question
jurisdiction. ." Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n. 32, 102 S. Ct. at
942 n.32. Some independent basis for federal jurisdiction must be
established. The petition in the case at bar has invoked the diversity
of citizenship of the parties as a means of acquiring subject matter
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The award of the arbitrators was
before the district court in this diversity case for review under state
law. As previously noted, state law relating to the propriety of a pu-
nitive damages award by arbitrators in the absence of an agreement
on the subject is not preempted by any federal substantive law bear-
ing on the subject.6
61. Id. (quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 518 (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 478-79
(1989)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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In this fashion, the tribunal confronted the jurisdictional anomaly
of the FAA, as pointed out earlier by Justice Brennan.67
Because jurisdiction was predicated upon diversity of citizenship
in this case, the Second Circuit relied upon the general rule that
state law dictates the propriety of a punitive damages award in
such disputes.6 8 Finding the applicable New York prohibition to be
substantive, the tribunal held it to be controlling in this
controversy.69
Notably, the Second Circuit panel left for another day what the
result would be if the parties had specified in their arbitration
agreement that punitive damages could be awarded. Judge Miner
commented that the New York rule, "to the extent that it purports
to prevent arbitrators from awarding punitive damages in the face
of such an agreement, seems to invoke preemption concerns, since
it runs afoul of the federal substantive law rules that sweep aside
any state attempt to interfere with the agreement of the parties. '70
Here, however, there was no such private agreement, and the tri-
bunal based its decision strictly upon the controlling NYSE arbi-
tration rules which "are silent with regard to the power of arbitra-
tors to award punitive damages. 7 1 Consider this carefully drawn
distinction:
As the district court observed, unlike the cases involving arbitration
agreements incorporating the rules of the American Arbitration As-
67. See supra p. 36 and note 14.
68. Id. (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 278 (1989)). In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court "has never held, or even intimated," that
an award of punitive damages implicates constitutional concerns. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. at 259-60; see Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1044 (1991) (holding
that a punitive damage award did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment). But cf. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. at 297-98 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(finding the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to punitive damages.
This article does not enter the ongoing debate about the propriety, constitutional or other-
wise, of awarding punitive damages. See Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1037-38.
69. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 518.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 518-19. Interestingly, the scope of the arbitration guidelines of the major securi-
ties industry self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") is nearly all-encompassing regarding
what disputes are arbitrable. See N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE CONST., art. XI, § 1, reproduced at
2 N.Y.S.E. Guide [CCH] 1501, at 1075 (June, 1991) (holding "[a]ny controversy" is arbi-
trable); AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE CONST., art. VIII, § 1, reproduced at 2 Am. Stock Ex.
Guide [CCH] % 9062, at 2181 (October, 1989) ("all controversies"); NATONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SEcuRrrIEs DEALERS CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE § 1 pt. 1 & § 12 (a) pt. III, repro-
duced at NASD Sec. Dealers Manual 3701, at 3711, & 1 3712, at 3713 (April, 1992) (stating
"[a]ny dispute, claim or controversy" is arbitrable).
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sociation ("AAA"), which provide that arbitrators may award "any
remedy or relief which [is] just and equitable and within the scope
of the agreement," see Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1386 (upholding AAA
award of punitive damages); Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business
Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1989) (same), the NYSE rules have
no provisions relating to remedy or relief. Clearly, if the NYSE
wanted to empower arbitrators to award punitive damages, it could
have done so. 7 2
In a final attempt to recover punitive damages, Waltman
claimed that the NYSE's arbitration award form contained a dis-
tinct heading "marked 'punitive damages.' ,,7' The tribunal was
not persuaded that the award form was part of the arbitration
agreement and refused to allow the award of punitive damages on
this basis. In a critical aside, the Second Circuit dryly added,
"moreover, NYSE arbitrations occur throughout the nation, and
our holding here does not mean that in those states in which arbi-
tral punitive damages awards are permitted, arbitrators may not
appropriately utilize the punitive damages section of the award
form. '7 4 Also, in a parting note that may be of significance in the
future, Judge Miner opined:
In a recent decision of this Court, the panel in dictum noted that "in
an appropriate case, the arbitrators could enhance [an award] by
punitive damages if prior misconduct established entitlement to
such damages." Kerr-McGee Refining Corp v. MIT Triumph, 924
F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387). In
Kerr-McGee, the plaintiff was awarded treble damages under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, in an arbitration proceeding. 924 F.2d at 469-
70. Kerr-McGee, however, was not a diversity case requiring a pre-
emption analysis, since RICO there provided federal question juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.75
One might speculate that the Second Circuit thereby created an
escape hatch from Fahnestock.
For all of the reasons discussed above, the majority of the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed the vacatur of the punitive damages award,
72. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 519 (citation omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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leaving Waltman with only his compensatory recovery. However,
the erudite dissent of Judge Mahoney is worth reviewing before
concluding the analysis of Fahnestock.
Judge Mahoney argued that the panel's analysis "misreads the
applicable law and creates an unnecessary conflict with two of our
sister circuits. ' 8 Contending that the majority's reliance on a state
law principle in an arbitration case was mistaken, the dissenting
judge opined:
The majority's approach effectively disregards the existence of a
"body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the
duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate," [Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 N. 32 (1982)], and
imposes the diversity regime of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). The Erie standard is intended,
however, for "all matters except those in which some federal law is
controlling." Id. at 72, 58 S. Ct. at 819. It therefore seems to me
clearly inappropriate to apply Erie-generated rules to an area for
which, the Supreme Court has instructed, federal law supplies the
rule of decision. That, however, is precisely what the majority has
done in this case. 77
In Judge Mahoney's view, the FAA requires federal district
courts to direct that arbitration proceed in the matter previously
agreed upon by the parties. 8 Therefore, "a state law which limits
freedom of contract with respect to arbitration agreements covered
by the FAA conflicts with the FAA and is preempted by it.' '79
On that basis, the dissenting opinion concluded "the cases that
have addressed the question whether punitive damages may be
awarded in arbitration have looked to the agreement between the
76. Id. at 520 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Id.; see 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). In relevant part, the statute provides:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrated
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district
court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a
civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the contro-
versy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in such agreement .... [T]he court shall make an order di-
recting the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.
9 U.S.C. § 4.
79. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 520 (Mahoney, J., dissenting); see Saturn Distrib. Corp. v.
Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 722 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990).
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parties to resolve the issue" and have rejected efforts to preclude
an arbitral award of punitive damages "even where the pertinent
contract explicitly stated that it was to be governed by New York
law."80 If such express contractual provisions to apply New York
state laws were insufficient to enforce that forum's punitive dam-
ages prohibition, certainly the "mere invocation of diversity juris-
diction" should not act as a bar in such cases."'
Furthermore, Judge Mahoney pointed out that the imposition of
state rule of decision "without respect to (or any meaningful in-
quiry regarding) the contractual intention of the parties, directly
contravenes the dominant purpose and policy of the FAA as re-
peatedly articulated by the Supreme Court. '8 2 Returning to the
significance of the arbitration award form denoting a punitive
damages category, Judge Mahoney found that "it is impossible on
this record to reach any conclusion pro or con" as to the form's
legal effect.85 For this reason, the dissent urged the panel to re-
mand the case for reconsideration by the district court.8 4
Critically, Judge Mahoney concluded that prior cases had not
addressed whether the New York anti-punitive damages rule
would preclude such awards in strictly FAA arbitrations. Accord-
ing to the dissenting judge, to give the rule such legal effect would
be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's "teaching that the FAA
'creates a body of federal substantive law.' "85 Judge Mahoney en-
ded on this note:
Although our precedents are ambiguous, I conclude that governing
Supreme Court doctrine, the vast weight of federal court authority
on the issue, and basic principles of federal arbitration law counsel
against the ruling of the majority in this case on the issue of puni-
tive damages. I therefore respectfully dissent from that ruling."6
80. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 521 (Mahoney, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 522.
85. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25
n. 32 (1982)).
86. Id.
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B. Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.
The Second Circuit reexamined this issue only a few months af-
ter handing down Fahnestock. In the case of Barbier v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc.,87 the result was the same; the court deter-
mined that punitive damages were an impermissible part of the
arbitration award. Judge Miner again authored the opinion, this
time for a different panel of the Second Circuit.
In this case, Bendelac, the plaintiffs' individual broker,8 argued
that the district court had incorrectly deferred to the provisions of
the FAA rather than the New York rule prohibiting an arbitrator
from awarding punitive damages. Recognizing that jurisdiction was
predicated on diversity of citizenship, he further argued that the
Erie doctrine demanded the forum's arbitration law be applied.
The panel reached the result Bendelac desired, but for different
reasons than those he articulated.8 9
Looking at the facts, Judge Miner first quoted those relevant
portions of the arbitration agreement that explicitly chose New
York state law as controlling and gave the parties the option to
arbitrate following either NYSE rules or National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) regulations. The Barbiers had filed
their claim to arbitrate with the NYSE. They were awarded judg-
ment, including punitive damages.90 As it had in Fahnestock, the
Second Circuit confirmed the compensatory damages award. Inter-
estingly, in its discussion, the court implied that the FAA is clearly
superior to state law in such cases.91
Although Bendelac argued that the FAA was inapplicable, the
tribunal found this "a strange contention because diversity juris-
diction serves as a basis for invoking the provisions of the FAA,
not as a ground for invoking the application of a state arbitration
statute. '92 Rather, the court determined that the FAA does apply
where there is federal subject matter jurisdiction, including juris-
diction by diversity, and where the agreement to arbitrate concerns
87. 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cr. 1991).
88. Id. at 120.
89. Id. at 118.
90. Id. at 119.
91. See id. at 120.
92. Id.; see Smiga v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1067 (1986).
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a transaction in interstate commerce.9 3 The Second Circuit held
that both requirements were undisputably met here. 4
On these grounds, the Second Circuit ruled that the Barbiers
properly invoked the FAA to confirm the arbitral award, and
added "[i]t is well-settled that judicial review of an arbitration
award is narrowly limited. '95 Furthermore, the panel's decision
rested in part upon the principle that courts generally do not look
beyond the lump sum of an award to dissect the rationale of the
arbitrators.96
At this point it appeared that the Barbier panel had determined
federal substantive law was controlling in many arbitration dis-
putes. However, the tribunal refused to chart a course different
from that followed in Fahnestock. Instead, the Second Circuit dis-
played a mild case of judicial schizophrenia: turning about one
hundred and eighty degrees, the court rejected the punitive dam-
ages award.
The parties' arguments regarding the propriety of punitive dam-
ages awards were not surprising. Bendelac urged the court to apply
New York's prohibition against awarding punitive damages be-
cause of requirements imposed by the Erie doctrine. In its amicus
curiae brief, the Securities Industry Association took the same po-
sition, but based its view on the ground that the choice-of-law
clause in the arbitration agreement directed that New York law be
applied. The Barbiers, on the other hand, asserted that the FAA
pre-empted the state rules of decision.9
The Second Circuit held that Fahnestock foreclosed the plain-
tiffs' arguments.98 Judge Miner found the relevant language of the
arbitration agreement to be clear and convincing; New York law
controlled. The judge explained, "[t]he FAA requires that private
agreements to arbitrate be enforced in accordance with their
93. Barbier, 948 F.2d at 120.
94. Id.; see also Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821, 823 (M.D.
N.C. 1983). Notably, New York District Court Judge Ward held that the interstate com-
merce requirement was met because the transaction entailed "the purchase and sale of se-
curities on a national exchange." Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 752 F. Supp.
151, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991).
95. Barbier, 948 F.2d at 120-21.
96. Id. at 121 (quoting Kurt Orban Co. v. Angeles Metal Sys., 573 F.2d 739, 740 (2d Cir.
1978)).
97. Id. at 121.
98. Id.
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terms."' In this case, the parties' agreement to be bound by New
York law terminated further options."'
The Second Circuit panel relied in part upon language from the
Fahnestock decision holding that the pre-emptive goal of the FAA
was developed principally to expunge state laws hampering arbi-
tration in derogation of freely negotiated agreements.101 Applying
this rationale, the panel found that enforcing New York's prohibi-
tion against awarding punitive damages was fully consistent with
federal arbitration law; as evinced by the inclusion of a choice-of-
law provision,10 2 these parties "intended to be bound" by the New
York rule. Interestingly, the court mentioned in passing that it
would reach the same conclusion even if punitive damages would
be permitted "in the absence of the choice-of-law provision."10 3
Attempting to use the court's focus on the contract language to
their advantage, the Barbiers classified the New York rule prohib-
iting arbitral awards of punitive damages as "arbitration law" and
contended that the choice-of-law provision in the arbitration
agreement "incorporates only state substantive law, and not state
arbitration law. '1 0 4 Relying upon Fahnestock, the Second Circuit
noted that the proper measure of damages in these cases is state
substantive law, and the rule against punitive damages fits this
definition.1 05
In closing, the Second Circuit found the punitive damages award
to the plaintiffs inappropriate primarily due to the choice-of-law
provision in the parties' agreement. Since the FAA provides that
an award may be vacated where the arbitrators exceed their pow-
ers,106 that portion of the award was vacated.10 7
99. Id. at 122 (quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 478-79
(1989)).
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Fahnestock & Co., Inc. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 380 (1991), and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1241 (1992)).
102. Id.; see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985) (stating that "as with any other contract, the parties' intentions control").
103. Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (Supp. II 1990). The full text of section 10(a) states:
(a) In any of the following cases, the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the appli-
cation of any party to the arbitration -
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
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On these grounds, the Second Circuit held that arbitrators could
not award punitive damages in securities industry arbitrations.
However, these holdings are seriously out of step with the deci-
sions of other federal tribunals and do not properly recognize the
dominant role of the federal substantive law of arbitration. Indeed,
neither Fahnestock nor Barbier sufficiently addresses the ques-
tions raised by Judge Mahoney's dissent in Fahnestock.
IV. FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES - THE MAJORITY VIEW
Beyond cavil, the Second Circuit's recent holdings forbidding
the award of punitive damages in arbitration proceedings are de-
monstrably at odds with the majority of federal court decisions
permitting such awards. As will be shown below, the great weight
of these decisions pre-empt restrictive state rules in favor of the
clear supremacy of the FAA and its developing common law
principles.
At the forefront of this body of precedent is a decision rendered
several years prior to the eruption of the present controversy. In a
prescient ruling, Chief Judge Hiram Ward of the Middle District
of North Carolina held in Willis v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc.108 that:
Federal law, the Federal Arbitration Act, applies to the arbitration
provision in the parties' account agreement since that agreement is a
written contract evidencing a transaction in interstate commerce.
Although the parties to a contract can agree that a certain state's
law will govern the resolution of issues submitted to arbitration (i.e.,
plaintiffs entitlement to punitive damages, assuming New York law
applies), federal law governs the categories of claims subject to arbi-
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
(5) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required
the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a
rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
107. Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122.
108. 569 F. Supp. 821 (M.D. N.C. 1983).
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tration. .... If an issue is arbitrable under federal law, it remains so
despite contrary state law.
The Court perceives no public policy reason persuasive enough to
justify prohibiting arbitrators from resolving issues of punitive dam-
ages submitted by the parties. Concluding that arbitrators may de-
termine such issues comports with the principle that under the fed-
eral act "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should
be resolved in favor of arbitration. ."109
Notably, Chief Judge Ward's opinion in Willis was cited with ap-
proval by the other Judge Ward of New York in the original
Barbier decision, since the arbitration provisions at issue were
identical. 110
Having established the foundation, it is necessary to examine the
key decisions from the United States Courts of Appeals permitting
arbitrators to award punitive damages.
A. Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
At the vanguard of appellate cases permitting the award of puni-
tive damages in arbitration proceedings is Bonar v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc."' In this case, the brokerage company had admit-
ted liability on the compensatory damages claim,1 2 leaving puni-
tive damages as the "central factual issue for the arbitrators to de-
cide. 11 3 A panel of the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district
court's approval of the punitive damages award, and remanded for
a new hearing on that issue, but did so on the ground that the
plaintiffs' "expert" witness had falsified his credentials and per-
jured himself on the stand.1 14
109. Id. at 823-24 (citations omitted); see also Ehrich v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 675
F. Supp. 559, 565 (D. S.D. 1987) (justifying award of compensatory damages, in part based
on "strong federal policy in favor of upholding an arbitrator's ability to fashion appropriate
remedies").
110. Barbier, 752 F. Supp. at 160. The consistency in the brokerage customer arbitration
agreements can be accounted for by the fact that Shearson/AMEX in Willis was the prede-
cessor to Shearson Lehman Hutton in Barbier.
111. 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1988).
112. Id. at 1380 n.2.
113. Id. at 1380. In this case, the individual broker was found guilty of embezzlement and
imprisoned. His name was Ed Leavenworth, an apropos surname, as the circumstances
proved.
114. Id. at 1383-86.
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The Eleventh Circuit's response to Dean Witter's arguments
that the arbitrators lacked the authority to award punitive dam-
ages is noteworthy. 115 Specifically, the brokerage firm claimed that
the customer agreement between the parties did not contemplate
an award of punitive damages in the arbitration proceedings. Al-
ternatively, the defendant asserted that the plaintiffs had waived
any right to punitive damages through the execution of the cus-
tomer agreement."' In fact, the arbitration agreement permitted
hearings before the NYSE, the New York State Chamber of Com-
merce, or the American Arbitration Association ("AAA")." 7 The
Bonars elected to proceed before the AAA." 8
Judge Kravitch laid out the basic issue to be resolved. The AAA
rules, incorporated by reference as a result of the parties' election
to proceed before that body, authorized the arbitrators to award
punitive damages. The rules broadly granted the arbitrators power
to fashion any just remedy within the scope of the parties' agree-
ment."19 However, the customer agreement had a choice-of-law
provision favoring New York, per force triggering that state's rule
prohibiting the award of punitive damages. 120 The panel had to de-
termine if the choice-of-law provision excluded punitive damages
from the scope of the parties' contract.1
21
The Eleventh Circuit found no such exclusion. Standing on its
previous affirmance in Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v.
Kajima International, Inc.,122 the tribunal recalled that a nearly
identical choice-of-law provision did not prevent an arbitrator
from awarding punitive damages. 23 Significantly, in Bonar, the
panel acknowledged that even the strong federal interest in pro-
moting arbitration "would not override a clear provision in a con-
tract prohibiting arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.' 1 24
Judge Kravitch summarized the court's holding, stating:
115. Id. at 1386-87. The brokerage firm also claimed the punitive damages award "was so
irrational as to be an abuse of the arbitrators' discretion." Id. at 1388. The court declined to
consider that altogether because the issue of punitives had been remanded for a new hearing
"where a new record would be developed." Id.
116. Id. at 1386.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1380.
119. Id. at 1386.
120. Id. at 1386-87.
121. Id. at 1387.
122. 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985), af'g 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
123. Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387.
124. Id. at 1387 n.16 (citing Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co., 598 F. Supp. at 364).
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Without the choice of law provision, the appellees' customer agree-
ment, like the contract in Willoughby, authorized the arbitrators to
award punitive damages. Furthermore, because the customer agree-
ment evidenced a transaction in interstate commerce, it is governed
by the Federal Arbitration Act. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. Under the rule of
construction announced in Willoughby, the addition of the choice of
law provision does not deprive the arbitrators of their power to
award punitive damages. Upon remand, the new panel of arbitrators
is free to award punitive damages if it finds that the facts warrant
such an award.125
Finally, the appellate court rejected Dean Witter's waiver argu-
ment.126 Chiding the agreement as "far from a model of clarity,"
the panel found the Bonars did not relinquish their right to puni-
tive damages.127 The issue of punitive damages was remanded for a
new hearing.1
28
The special concurrence of Judge Tjoflat in this case is notewor-
thy. While "agree[ing] that under circuit precedent the arbitrator
in this case is not precluded from awarding punitive damages," the
learned jurist struggled to understand "how punitive damages can
ever be considered within the scope of the agreement of the par-
ties' absent some express provision in the contract.1 1 29 While ex-
plicitly stating he was not giving short shrift to federal policy aims
here, Judge Tjoflat suggested that when parties contract to arbi-
trate, they are simply agreeing to resolve contractual issues in that
mode.1 30 He continued:
Whether [the scope of the agreement of the parties] can fairly be
said to encompass the assessment of a penalty for willful or wanton
misconduct, however, is extremely doubtful. Punitive damages are
designed to serve the societal functions of punishment and deter-
rence; unlike contract remedies, they are not designed to vindicate
the parties' contractual bargain. Consequently, absent an express
provision in the contract, punitive damages should be considered as
outside the scope of the parties' agreement and beyond the power of
the arbitrator to award.13
125. Id. at 1387.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1388.
128. Id.
129. Id. (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1389.
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The concurring opinion asserted that the AAA rules recognized
this principle by providing that arbitrators may award only those
remedies within the scope of the parties' agreement. Other courts
have applied this principle to support their decisions holding that
arbitrators could not award punitive damages "absent an express
provision in the contract. ' 13 2 In unmasked criticism, Judge Tjoflat
concluded, "I believe that our circuit's adherence to a different
rule reflects a basic misunderstanding of the nature of punitive
damages and the scope of arbitrators' remedial powers.""' s
B. Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Systems, Inc.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also has ad-
dressed the instant controversy, but in a non-securities industry
context, in the landmark case Raytheon Co. v. Automated Busi-
ness Systems, Inc.134 Interestingly, the opinion was rendered by
Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.3 5 As
Judge Reinhardt wrote at the outset, "This case requires us to de-
termine whether commercial arbitrators have the power and au-
thority to award punitive damages pursuant to a general contrac-
tual arbitration clause which does not specifically provide for the
award of such damages." '
In Raytheon, the district court confirmed an arbitral award that
included $250,000 in punitive damages.1 37 As in Bonar, the AAA
rules of arbitration were applied. 138
Commencing its discussion of the case, the appellate court estab-
lished that because the underlying transaction affected interstate
commerce, "the broad policies of the [FAA] govern our analy-
sis.1 s'3 Alluding to the general comments made by the U.S. Su-
preme Court that any doubts concerning the scope of arbitration
must be resolved in favor of arbitration, the First Circuit empha-
sized that "our conclusion that the arbitrators did not exceed their
132. Id. (citing Howard P. Foley Co. v. IBEW, Local 639, 789 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir.
1986); International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers, Local 34 v. Gen-
eral Pipe Covering, Inc., 792 F.2d 96, 100 (8th Cir. 1986); Baltimore Regional Joint Bd. v.
Webster Clothes, Inc., 596 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1979)).
133. Id.
134. 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989).
135. Id. at 6.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 7.
139. Id. at 9 (citation omitted).
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powers in awarding punitive damages in this case is predicated
upon substantially more rigorous analysis.
140
Turning to the text of the arbitration clause, the tribunal noted
that: (a) the language unequivocally required all disputes to be set-
tled by arbitration, and (b) the arbitration was to be held pursuant
to AAA rules.141 As they had in Bonar, the AAA rules bestowed
upon the arbitrators broad powers to fashion any remedy within
the scope of the parties' agreement.' 42 The First Circuit panel com-
bined these two observations to reformulate the issue as a determi-
nation of whether punitive damages were within the scope of the
parties' agreement.' 43
The court commented that, if it confined itself to the language of
the arbitration clause, the text "was sufficiently broad to encom-
pass the award of punitive damages," especially since courts are to
construe such agreements generously.' 44 However, the tribunal
went beyond the contractual language and examined the case law
pertaining to this issue.145
Raytheon argued that arbitrators must have explicit contractual
authority to award punitive damages. However, the First Circuit
disagreed, finding the cases that Raytheon cited in support of its
position inapposite because they were labor arbitrations dominated
by collective bargaining concerns that are "not present in a com-
mercial arbitration context.' 48 Focusing on the commercial arbi-
tration cases, therefore, the panel discussed the New York rule
prohibiting punitive damage awards by arbitrators. Noting that the
New York rule has been "sharply criticized," this tribunal "de-
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 9-10.
143. Id. at 10.
144. Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
626 (1985)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 10-11; cf. Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d
1159 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985) (award of punitive damages is be-
yond the scope of the collective bargaining agreement); Bacardi Corp. v. Congreso de
Uniones Industriales de Puerto Rico, 692 F.2d 210 (1st Cir. 1982) (arbitrator awarding puni-
tive damages exceeds his authority because such an award does not draw its essence from
collective bargaining agreement). This point also undercuts Judge Tjoflat's special concur-
rence in Bonar where he cited labor arbitration cases in opposition to an arbitrator's power
to award punitive damages in securities industry proceedings. Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1388. As
the First Circuit correctly notes, the vastly different context of these two arbitration forums
invalidates any significant correlation between them on this issue. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 10-
11.
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cline[d] to adopt such a restrictive approach to arbitration
here.",147
The First Circuit found Bonar to be the most prominent federal
precedent on this issue, 4" and parenthetically adopted the view,
held by a number of other courts, that choice-of-law provisions do
not dictate the answer in the commercial arbitration setting;
"[r]ather, we, like they, look to federal common law" to decide if
punitive damages are appropriate. 14 The court stated that this
conclusion was supported by the "parties' adoption of AAA rules
...and the general canon that federal law governs the construc-
tion of arbitration agreements respecting interstate commerce.' 150
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Volt Information Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees'5' did not change the First Circuit's con-
clusion, because in Volt the "scope of the arbitration agreement
was not disputed."' 52 In Raytheon, on the other hand, the precise
issue was one of scope: did the agreement encompass punitive
damages? 5 ' Ultimately, Raytheon "conceded that federal law
controlled.' 5 4
For these reasons, Judge Reinhardt opined:
We ... can see no reasoned justification for departing from the rule
laid down by our colleagues in other parts of the nation. Like them,
we agree that punitive damages can serve as an effective deterrent to
malicious or fraudulent conduct. Where such conduct could give rise
to punitive damages if proved to a court, there is no compelling rea-
son to prohibit a party which proves the same conduct to a panel of
arbitrators from recovering the same damages. Certainly, the fact
that the parties agreed to resolve their dispute through an expedited
and less formal procedure does not mean that they should be re-
quired to surrender a legitimate claim to damages. Parties that do
wish arbitration provisions to exclude punitive damages claims are
free to draft agreements that do so explicitly.155
147. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 11.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 11 n.5.
150. Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
151. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
152. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 11 n.5; see infra pp. 57-60.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 11.
155. Id. at 12.
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Since no such exclusion existed in the instant agreement, the First
Circuit upheld the award of punitive damages. 15 6
A substantial number of appellate court decisions stand counter-
poised to the Second Circuit's holdings. The Eleventh and First
Circuits have put forth the better argument, for their respective
holdings correctly apply the dominant federal substantive law of
arbitration which permits arbitrators to award punitive damages.
Bonar is particularly telling, for it would authorize such awards in
appropriate circumstances. At the same time, this decision recog-
nizes that the parties' freedom to contract permits them to exclude
punitive damages from any arbitral award.
V. VOLT - A KEY FOR THE CIRCUITS
Indispensable to this discussion are the U.S. Supreme Court's
findings in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees. 57
However, the mixed signals in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
make this holding a particularly difficult one to appraise. The basic
question in Volt revolved around a California state law that al-
lowed a court to stay arbitration proceedings pending the outcome
of related litigation. The majority held that the application of Cali-
fornia's statute was not pre-empted by the FAA where the parties
had agreed that their arbitration would be governed by state
law.. 58
The agreement between the litigants in Volt had a choice-of-law
clause selecting California law as the applicable law. 59 The parties
also had contracted to abide by AAA rules. °60 The appellant ar-
gued that this did not per force mean California law controlled,' 61
and in any event, "questions of arbitrability ... must be resolved
with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration. 162
Although conceding the broad policy goals of the FAA favor ar-
bitration, the majority nevertheless held that the statutory body
"does not confer a right to compel arbitration of any dispute at
any time; it confers only the right to obtain an order directing that
156. Id.
157. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
158. Id. at 470.
159. Id. at 474.
160. Id. at 470 n.1.
161. Id. at 474.
162. Id. at 475 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 n.10 (1983)).
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'arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the parties']
agreement.' "1e8 While "due regard must be given to the federal
policy favoring arbitration,""1 4 it is not offensive under the FAA to
apply state law in such disputes.
The context of this proceeding was vitally important; the case
presented a question of proceeding "under a certain set of proce-
dural rules. . . governing the conduct of arbitration - rules which
are manifestly designed to encourage resort to the arbitral pro-
cess." 165 Applying state law in this context simply did no violence
to the federal policy favoring arbitration. 1 6
Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court found nothing in the FAA to
prevent the application of the California stay of arbitration stat-
ute. Chief Justice Rehnquist commented: "The FAA contains no
express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional
intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration. 1 6 7 Yet the Court
hastened to add:
But even when Congress has not completely displaced state regula-
tion in an area, state law may nonetheless be pre-empted to the ex-
tent that it actually conflicts with federal law - that is, to the ex-
tent that it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 6"
Returning to what the FAA does not do, the majority ruled it
does not prevent parties "from excluding certain claims from the
scope of their arbitration agreement. It simply requires courts to
enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other
contracts, in accordance with their terms."1 69
The Chief Justice acknowledged the cases in which the federal
arbitration law was held to pre-empt state statutes.17 0 Yet Volt was
not such a case for these reasons:
163. Id. at 474-75 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988)) (emphasis in original).
164. Id. at 476.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956)).
167. Id. at 477.
168. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
169. Id. at 478 (citations omitted); see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).
170. 489 U.S. at 478-79. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
[W]e have held that the FAA pre-empts state laws which "require a judicial forum
for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitra-
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[I]t does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the
Act itself. Indeed, such a result would be quite inimical to the FAA's
primary purpose of ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are
enforced according to their terms. Arbitration under the Act is a
matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to
structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.17 1
This, of course, includes the ability of the parties to "limit by con-
tract the issues which they will arbitrate."1 2 By permitting en-
forcement of express terms even in derogation of the FAA, the
Court claimed that it effectuated the contractual rights of the par-
ties "without doing violence to the policies" of the FAA. 17 3
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented.1 4 Justice
Brennan agreed that the FAA does not pre-empt state arbitration
rules, even for contracts involving interstate commerce, if the par-
ties have agreed to abide by the state rules and exclude the federal
law.17 5 However, the dissent contended that the true issue was
whether or not the parties had in fact contractually agreed to ex-
clude the FAA, "[aind that question, we have made clear in the
past, is a matter of federal law."'76 Justice Brennan asserted that
the FAA established a body of federal substantive law.17 7 In this
context, the dissent took issue with the interpretation of the
choice-of-law provision in the litigants' contract as an exclusionary
clause. Justice Brennan proposed:
It seems to me beyond dispute that the normal purpose of such
choice-of-law clauses is to determine that the law of one State rather
than that of another State will be applicable; they simply do not
tion." Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). See, e.g., id., at 10-16 (find-
ing pre-empted a state statute which rendered agreements to arbitrate certain
franchise claims unenforceable); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S., [sic] at 490 (finding pre-
empted a state statute which rendered unenforceable private agreements to arbitrate
certain wage collection claims).
Id.
171. Id. at 479.
172. Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985)).
173. Id.
174. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 481 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 485 (citing United Steelwork-
ers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) ("[A] party cannot be re-
quired to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.")).
176. Id. at 485 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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speak to any interaction between state and federal law. A cursory
glance at standard conflicts texts confirms this observation: they
contain no reference at all to the relation between federal and state
law in their discussions of contractual choice-of-law clauses.1 8
Furthermore, "settled principles of federal supremacy" dictate
that the law of any chosen state includes federal law.1"9 This is the
only possible result, warned Justice Brennan, for
[w]ere every state court to construe such clauses as an expression of
the parties' intent to exclude the application of federal law, as has
the California Court of Appeal in this case, the result would be to
render the Federal Arbitration Act a virtual nullity as to presently
existing contracts. 180
Justice Brennan refused to believe that the parties here intended
such a draconian outcome from a boilerplate choice-of-law
clause.181
Volt plays a critical role in the resolution of the controversy over
whether arbitrators should have the power to award punitive dam-
ages. While both the majority and the dissent express differences
of opinion, there is ample legal reasoning in the decision that can
be applied to sort out the competing interests within this
controversy.
VI. ANALYSIS
We now come to the most difficult task - attempting to parse
the foregoing case law into a cogent discussion for the purpose of
resolving the instant controversy. Without doubt, this question of
the power of arbitrators to award punitive damages in securities
industry arbitrations is a very close one indeed.
178. Id. at 488 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 490 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 157 n.12 (1982); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 490 (1880);
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876).
180. 489 U.S. at 491 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 491-92 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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A. Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration
As in any other legal analysis, it is important to consider the
presumptions underlying the disputed question. Here, even a facial
examination of the relevant dogma reveals a pervasive favoritism
towards the federal law for regulating arbitration. The U.S. Su-
preme Court clearly has insisted that arbitration agreements be
enforced according to their terms. Pursuant to both statute and
common law, the decision to proceed to arbitration is a matter of
contract, and not the whim of a judiciary sometimes jealously
guarding its domain.
But the correct implementation of this federal policy is some-
what less clear. As demonstrated above, numerous statements by
the Court have declared, in turn, that this national policy favoring
arbitration (i) is rigorously enforceable by virtue of the Commerce
Clause of the Federal Constitution; (ii) is an embodiment of fed-
eral substantive (and not procedural) law; and, (iii) by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause, may on occasion pre-empt state law. These ele-
ments comprise a natural progression in law, each level gaining
support and validity from its predecessor.
Southland Corp. v. Keating82 speaks particularly well to these
points. Nevertheless, its dissenters made it plain that the Justices
do not speak as one on the crucial points of federal supremacy and
any concomitant pre-emption in this arena. 83 It is still true that
the FAA lacks an express pre-emption provision, which has led the
Supreme Court to hold that state law yet survives in some in-
stances, overwhelmed by the federal law of arbitration only where
the two bodies truly conflict. Notwithstanding the force of its
Commerce Clause analysis in these matters, the Court still hesi-
tates to find that Congress intended to occupy the entire field of
arbitration. While proper respect and deference must still be given
to the supremacy and pre-emption analyses already discussed, fur-
ther guidance from the Court is necessary if we are to resolve the
punitive damages issue.
182. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
183. Id. at 21-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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B. The Role of Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of
Trustees
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees 4 helps to
provide this guidance. Clearly, the Court held that state law was
not pre-empted in every eventuality by the FAA. However, it is
noteworthy that the dispute in Volt had its locus in a procedural
point, not an issue of substantive law. This major distinction could
be dispositive in the instant controversy, for the prevailing view is
that the awarding of punitive damages is a substantive legal issue.
Therefore, the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses dictate that the
issue of whether an arbitrator can award punitive damages ought
to be determined by federal law.
Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized in Volt that the
partial pre-emptive effect of the FAA mandated that arbitration be
held in the manner that the parties agreed to by contract.185 In so
holding, the Volt majority opinion may, on one hand, de-empha-
size the supremacy of the federal act, while simultaneously opening
the portal to a possible avenue of resolution for the controversy.
By acknowledging that, within the strictures of the FAA, parties
retain power to dictate what issues they may or may not submit to
arbitration, the Volt majority suggests that precedence must be
given to the contractual analysis of what the parties have actually
agreed to arbitrate, including any award of punitive damages. This
would fulfill the Court's closing edict that the contract to arbitrate
as made by the parties be honored and enforced according to its
own terms, with due respect for the FAA and the strong federal
policy favoring arbitration. 86
Cast in this light, Justice Brennan's dissent in Volt takes on in-
creased importance. To be sure, Justice Brennan chose to reiterate
the role of the FAA and its evolving case law as a substantive
body. The supremacy of the federal jurisprudence thereby firmly
established, it took just a short step for the dissent to criticize the
excessive importance some courts attach to the choice-of-law
clause found in typical arbitration agreements.
Being simultaneously true to both his view of the FAA as sub-
stantive law and the majority's will to enforce arbitration solely by
184. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
185. Id. at 472.
186. Id. at 479.
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the terms of the parties' contract, Justice Brennan implicitly com-
bined the two views.187 In so doing, he found that the federal law
nevertheless prevailed, for choice-of-law clauses ordinarily resolve
state-to-state conflicts, not state-to-federal law disputes, and, in
any event, state law does per force include federal law, by virtue of
the latter's preeminence. 188
This view recognizes the strong federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion by interpreting arbitration contracts in a way consistent both
with the parties' wishes and the required supremacy of federal ar-
bitration law. All of this is in accordance with Justice Brennan's
essential holding in Moses H. Cone that the federal policy must be
vindicated, notwithstanding the role that sometimes-conflicting
state law may play.189 On these grounds, it is clear that punitive
damages awards in securities industry arbitrations are allowed
under federal law in appropriate circumstances, and cannot be
cancelled out where the federal substantive law and policy reign
supreme.
C. Choice-of-Law - An Erroneous Selection
As we have seen, both Fahnestock 90 and Barbier91 devoted
much discussion to and then relied upon the choice of law provi-
sion in the relevant arbitration contracts. It may be that this is
exactly where the Second Circuit has been led down the wrong
track in its analysis. By virtue of its two recent decisions, the Sec-
ond Circuit is, among other things, according too much import to
the choice-of-law provisions in the arbitration agreement when it
finds that the selection of New York law mandates application of
that state's anti-arbitral punitive damages rule.
A reading of Volt and the other relevant precedents of the U.S.
Supreme Court, as previously suggested, dictates that the opera-
tive choice-of-law clauses do not exclude federal law. Rather, fed-
eral law is to be included. Because federal law embodies a strong
policy favoring arbitration, the ability to arbitrate, including the
awarding of punitive damages, should be enforced. To the extent
that the state law conflicts with federal, it must be put aside.
187. Id. at 479-92 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 489-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. See supra p. 39 and note 46.
190. Fahnestock & Co., Inc. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991).
191. Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991).
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According the appropriate supremacy to federal arbitration law
would also seem to solve the conundrum the Second Circuit cre-
ated with respect to jurisdiction in Barbier.192 There, the panel
found the FAA did apply in diversity cases where the transaction
underlying the arbitration was one in interstate commerce. 193
While the court thus acknowledged the presence of federal subject
matter jurisdiction, it nevertheless seemed to abandon that precept
by citing the forum's prohibition against punitive damages as con-
trolling.1 94 This confusion must and can be resolved in the instant
context, and correctly resolved in favor of the paramount role of
the federal arbitration law.
Moreover, instead of avoiding the question by citing the fact
that the parties' agreement in Fahnestock did not address the op-
tion of an award of punitive damages,195 the Second Circuit should
have interpreted that silence consonant with the federal law, and
not the state prohibition against punitive damages awards. Even if
federal pre-emption were not found, the parties' contractual choice
of law could still accommodate federal law, which by its broad pol-
icy aims favors arbitration of all controversies, including punitive
damages.
This bows to the Volt command that the contract to arbitrate be
enforced by its own terms. Indeed, Judge Miner's positing of the
unanswered question of what the result would be if the parties had
agreed to permit punitive damages awards, in light of New York's
rule against such awards, 96 speaks mightily towards the Fahnes-
tock court's internal reservations, and denotes a possible future ac-
ceptance of the course charted above.
It is well accepted that the federal policy mandates that "any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the con-
struction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver,
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."1 97 Why then does the Sec-
ond Circuit resist the application of the FAA and then defer to a
state rule where, as is clear in Barbier, the language of the arbitra-
tion agreement explicitly insists that any controversy must be sub-
192. Id.
193. Id. at 120.
194. Id. at 121-22.
195. 935 F.2d at 517.
196. Id. at 518.
197. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
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mitted to arbitration?'9 8 To be sure, it has been recognized else-
where that parties may contractually authorize their arbitrators to
award punitive damages.199 This is certainly consistent with the
Volt edict on enforcing an arbitration contract according to its own
terms.
Furthermore, in past Second Circuit decisions it appeared well-
settled that federal arbitration law applied to contracts embraced
by the FAA, even where a New York choice-of-law provision was
within the agreement at issue.200 Those earlier rulings placed the
tribunal in the mainstream, for other courts have held likewise.20 1
D. Staying the Narrow Road for Reversal
Among other things, the Second Circuit failed to reconcile its
usurpation of the arbitrators' awards in both Fahnestock20 2 and
Barbier20 3 with its own relevant precedents. For instance, the Sec-
ond Circuit has consistently accorded the narrowest of readings to
the FAA's authorization to vacate awards based upon section 10 of
that statutory scheme. 04 Indeed, even Judge Miner in Fahnestock
acknowledged the tribunal's distaste for anything but a narrow
reading of the vacatur provision.20 5 Although professing not to vio-
late that principle in its recent holdings, the reality is glaringly to
the contrary - the circuit bench is all too willing to intercede and
circumvent the arbitrators' judgment.
198. See Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 151, 159-60 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
199. See Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 651
(5th Cir. 1979) (arbitrators derive their authority from the scope of the contractual agree-
ment); Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 109-110 (9th Cir. 1962) (scope of arbitrator's
authority rests on the parties' agreement).
200. See, e.g., I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1974)
("New York courts, in dealing with arbitration disputes where the contract involves inter-
state commerce, apply federal, and not state, arbitration law" notwithstanding a provision
in the parties' agreement that it be governed by New York law); Masthead Mac Drilling
Corp. v. Fleck, 549 F. Supp. 854, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting Rothberg v. Loeb, Rhoades,
& Co., 445 F. Supp. 1336 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
201. See, e.g., New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 4 n.2 (1st
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989); Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 818
F.2d 1089, 1094 n.4 (3rd Cir. 1987); Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate
Gas Corp., 797 F.2d 238, 243-44 (5th Cir. 1986).
202. Fahnestock & Co., Inc. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991).
203. Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991).
204. See, e.g., Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 579 F.2d 691,
703 (2d Cir. 1978).
205. See Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 515.
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Indeed, why should an award of punitive damages be beyond the
power of an arbitrator? Any distinction is purely contrived, for ar-
bitrators may decide matters of treble damages under both civil
RICO206 and the antitrust laws.10 7 Once again, even in Fahnestock
the Second Circuit noted that it had previously allowed a RICO
treble damage award to proceed in an arbitration.20 8 Given that tri-
bunal's acknowledgement of such outcomes in its own jurisdiction,
why not permit punitive damage awards in securities industry ar-
bitrations as well? No rational reason exists for a contrary rule.
E. A Much Needed Reconciliation
It is also vitally important to reconcile the recent decisions of
the Second Circuit against awarding punitive damages in securities
industry arbitrations with the majority view of other federal courts
on the controversy, lest this inter-circuit dichotomy escalate. The
other tribunals appear to have the better of the argument, being
guided primarily by a broad application of federal policy favoring
arbitration, including the award of punitive damages.2 0 9 These
courts have rightly found that the federal mandate to allow arbi-
tration to proceed unencumbered necessarily allows the arbitrator
to fashion appropriate remedies for the fair and equitable resolu-
tion of the parties' dispute. If such a cure includes punitive dam-
ages, so be it. A bright-line distinction between compensatory and
punitive damages is not called for, does not serve the interests of
justice, and fails to serve the federal policy of fostering level fo-
rums for arbitration across the nation.
In Bonar, the Eleventh Circuit recognized these elements when
it found that the parties' choice-of-law clause did not preclude an
award of punitive damages.2 10 That tribunal accorded the proper
respect to the federal mandate by not excluding a punitive dam-
ages award on the basis of a contrary state law. Moreover, the
panel implied that had the parties specifically contracted to ex-
clude punitive damages, their wishes would have to be respected.211
206. Shearson/American Express Inc., v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
207. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985).
208. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 519 (citing Kerr-McGee Ref. Corp. v. M/T Triumph, 924
F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1991)).
209. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989);
Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1988).
210. Bonar v. Dean Whitter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1387 (11th Cir. 1988).
211. Id. at 1387-88.
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Bonar thereby satisfied the primary concerns raised by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the Volt 212 decision, by enforcing federal arbi-
tration law to its full extent without encroaching on private con-
tract interests.2 13
Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Systems, Inc.2 14 proceeds
in company with Bonar, as it too garners authority for federal
supremacy from the Commerce Clause analysis often relied upon
by the High Court.215 The First Circuit provides some notable in-
put about the arguments typically made regarding whether .the
scope of the parties' agreement to arbitrate necessarily contem-
plates an award of punitive damages.2 16 Interpreting the sweeping
language of the arbitration clause that all disputes must be arbi-
trated and the similarly broad coverage of the applicable AAA
rules,21 this tribunal easily found that an award of punitive dam-
ages was within the parties' agreement to arbitrate.21 s
Certainly, the First Circuit did not torture the meaning of either
the contract or the AAA rules to reach this result. Rather, its read-
ing of the text was straightforward, setting an example to be fol-
lowed elsewhere. Critically, the tribunal also made its holding with
a full awareness of Volt and all its conflicting nuances. 219 Indeed,
one could venture that Raytheon is a natural and welcome out-
come of the principles espoused by Chief Justice Rehnquist in that
High Court landmark.
In sum, the foregoing analysis clearly points to the same result
- punitive damages may be awarded in securities industry arbi-
trations. The overriding federal law and policy mandates, the bet-
ter and majority view of the circuits, and all of the other points
analyzed above, lead away from the Second Circuit's recent deci-
sions espousing contrary results. Having determined that, however,
what will be its impact on the securities industry?
212. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
213. See supra p. 62 and notes 185-86.
214. 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989).
215. Id. at 10-11.
216. Id. at 9.
217. Id. at 9-12.
218. Id. at 11-12 n.5.
219. Id.
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VII. PUNITIVE DAMAGES - A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TO
THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
This writing espouses the position that, in the proper circum-
stances, punitive damages may be awarded by arbitrators in securi-
ties industry disputes. However, one crucial point that this article
does not intend to minimize is the danger this line of legal reason-
ing presents to the securities industry.
Still shaking off the effects of the 1987 "Black Monday" stock
market crash and the lingering doldrums of the recession, the in-
dustry does not need the incredible potential for harm that awards
of punitive damages engender. Having hailed arbitration as an
enormous savings of time and resources that would otherwise be
diverted into unprofitable litigation, and only recently having won
a hard-fought victory to compel arbitration of all customer claims
in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,220 the securities
industry may suffer a tremendous setback if arbitrators are given
the power to award punitive damages.
While finding that the weight of authority clearly bestows the
power to award punitive damages upon the arbitrators in most
cases, this writer is by no means insensitive to the crushing burden
this conclusion may entail. Consider the unique status accorded
punitives damages by Justice O'Connor:
[P]unitive damages are quasi-criminal punishment. Unlike compen-
satory damages, which serve to allocate an existing loss between two
parties, punitive damages are specifically designed to exact punish-
ment in excess of actual harm to make clear the defendant's miscon-
duct was especially reprehensible. Hence, there is a stigma attached
to an award of punitive damages that does not accompany a purely
compensatory award. The punitive character of punitive damages
means that there is more than just money at stake.221
How should the industry protect itself from possible debilitating
results? Clearly, the answer does not lie in hiding behind state law
prohibitions against arbitrators awarding punitive damages. Such
defenses are mere Maginot Lines, easily outflanked by the over-
powering forces of federal supremacy and the other rationales out-
220. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
221. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1062 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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lined above. Moreover, such restrictions are not uniform among the
fifty states, and, as New York has demonstrated, are often subject
to criticism within their own forums. Indeed, such criticism may
foster a change that destroys the last rampart of protection for the
industry. Thus, the now discredited choice of law proposition af-
fords no comfort in light of today's developments in the law.
But what does remain a formidable bulwark against punitive
damage awards in securities industry arbitrations is the arbitration
contract itself. As alluded to in Volt, and adhered to by courts
awarding punitive damages, the parties' freedom to agree as they
see fit allows them to contractually exclude any award of punitive
damages from a subsequent arbitration of their disputes.22 This
proposition stands unchallenged; obviously so, because it goes to
the very heart of the contractual freedom to fashion arbitration
agreements in any manner the parties choose. Once structured, it
is this individualized format that the federal courts must rigor-
ously enforce, even if punitive damage awards are thereby
excluded.
Thus, the path to be taken is clearly marked. The securities in-
dustry needs to clearly define its arbitration contracts as preclud-
ing any arbitrators' award of punitive damages. This may be easier
said than done, for bodies such as the AAA do not include such a
prohibition in their own rules of arbitration. Yet, the explicit
agreement of the parties regarding the scope of the contract to ar-
bitrate should overcome any contrary rules of the arbitration
organization.
The viability of such contractual exclusions of punitive damages
from industry arbitration agreements is uncertain. Customers may
simply refuse to agree to such clauses or subsequently challenge
them later as contracts of adhesion. Another possibility is that the
public, in the official form of Congress or the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, may enter the fray and promulgate statutes or
regulations to outlaw or restrict such a preclusion.
Given the danger punitive damage awards present to the securi-
ties industry, and the potential for intervention by the federal gov-
ernment, the stock brokerages are advised to proceed cautiously.
Among other things, it is suggested here that the securities indus-
try mobilize its forces not just to protect its interests by trying to
222. See, e.g., Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1989).
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contractually preclude arbitral awards of punitive damages, but
also to seek the creation of new parameters which would at least
ensure that the awarding of punitive damages, if allowed, is done
in a responsible way. Since it is quite conceivable that punitive
damages are now a fixed part of the arbitration landscape, the se-
curities industry can rightly take appropriate countermeasures to
make sure their draconian effect does not go unchecked.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The awarding of punitive damages in securities industry arbitra-
tions is a sensitive and controversial issue. On one hand, wronged
plaintiffs crave retribution from the malefactor and society seeks
to deter future misconduct by meting out punishment. On the
other hand, the securities industry, having recently emerged victo-
rious in its struggle to compel arbitration in these disputes, now
faces the potential for devastating harm if punitive damage awards
become the rule of the day. How are these competing interests to
be reconciled?
In deliberating upon this question, the one constant that must
be remembered is that the federal arbitration law evinces a con-
gressionally mandated policy of favoring the enforcement of the
parties' agreement to arbitrate. Founded upon the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the federal law must reign su-
preme. To be sure, explicit federal pre-emption is lacking, thus
leaving any surviving state law to play a part in such proceedings.
Nevertheless, the bias towards the strong federal policy to favor
arbitration must be accorded a "healthy respect."
The controversy has now reached groundswell proportions, as
the Second Circuit has declared that punitives cannot be awarded
by arbitrators. By relying upon the forum state's prohibition
against such outcomes in arbitration, this tribunal has taken a dia-
metrically opposite view from its brethren on this subject. It is re-
spectfully suggested here that the appellate court's rationale is
flawed, and the majority and better view allowing arbitrators to
award punitive damages in appropriate circumstances should pre-
vail for securities industry arbitrations.
The teachings of the U.S. Supreme Court, while confusing at
some junctures, still clearly accommodate the awarding of punitive
damages in arbitration. Among other decisions, Volt Information
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Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees223 tacitly endorses such lati-
tude, as long as the arbitration contract is enforced according to its
own terms. Certainly, the great weight of guidance from the High
Court, and the implementation thereof by numerous lower tribu-
nals, proves there is no reason to simply exclude punitive damage
awards from arbitration. Even the Second Circuit acknowledges
this, as a matter of federal law.
It seems that the sticking point is forum state rules which ban
the giving of punitive awards by arbitrators. Yet, it is contended
here, such edicts must fail because of the supremacy of the federal
law of arbitration, which contains no such prohibition. Any other
result simply elevates state law over federal, on what is unques-
tionably an issue of federal substantive law. Such a result is not
proper.
What the U.S. Supreme Court decisions and their progeny do
tell us is that the agreement to arbitrate must be enforced by the
terms contracted to by the parties. Certainly, if the parties agreed
to exclude an award of punitive damages from the arbitrators'
powers, so be it: contractual freedom among private parties de-
mands that their wishes regarding how to structure their own arbi-
tration must be honored, including any prohibition against the
awarding of certain categories of damages. But if the agreement is
silent, the supreme power of the federal law must control, and that
jurisprudence permits punitive damage awards by arbitrators.
This being the case, it is now up to the securities industry to
meet the challenge thus offered. If punitive damages are author-
ized by law, the stock brokerages must exercise their inherent free-
dom of contract to specifically agree beforehand that such awards
are excluded from future arbitrations. Because those efforts may
meet with public or regulatory opposition, the secutities industry
should immediately start to take a proactive role in promulgating
appropriate rules for industry arbitrations.
While any new rules need not necessarily prohibit an award of
punitive damages, such new regulations should operate to confine
their use to rightful and appropriate circumstances. As Justice
O'Connor recently noted:
Punitive damages are a powerful weapon. Imposed wisely and with
restraint, they have the potential to advance legitimate state inter-
223. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
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ests. Imposed indiscriminately, however, they have a devastating po-
tential for harm.224
The securities industry must take up the gauntlet in its chosen fo-
rum of arbitration, and assure that if punitive damages are to be
awarded, they serve society's interest in doing justice on the whole,
without harming our vital financial services industry.
224. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1056 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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